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Summary  
 
Game theory proposes several allocation solutions: we know (a) fairness properties, (b) how to 
develop (c) methods building on these properties, and (d) how to calculate (e) allocations. We 
also know how to influence the perceived fairness and realization of allocation solutions. 
However, we cannot explain properly that theoretically fair allocation methods are rarely used. 
To obtain more insight into these issues we solved an allocation problem in a purchasing 
cooperative case study by confronting theory with perceptions. We find large theoretical and 
perception differences and inconsistencies between and within the five steps from a to e. We note 
that theoretically fair methods tend to be more complex than theoretically unfair methods. In 
addition, the allocations of some simple methods are perceived fairer than the allocations of 
complex methods in our case study. To improve theoretical solutions the focus should be on a 
and c. To influence perceptions the focus should be on b, c, and d. Finally, all five steps are 
modeled into comparable fairness measures and a general model. Using this model implies that 
both theory and perceptions are considered in solving allocation problems.   
 
Educator and practitioner summary  
 
Allocation conflicts occur often; despite that we know in theory what fair allocation solutions are; 
despite that we know in practice how to positively influence the perceived fairness and 
realization of allocation solutions. In this paper we therefore solve an allocation problem in a 
purchasing cooperative by confronting theory with perceptions. We develop comparable fairness 
measures and develop a general model for solving allocation problems.  
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Introduction of the topic 
 
Recently two next-door organizations independently decided to sell their organizations. The 
value of organization A was € 4 million; the value of organization B was € 2 million. 
Organization C showed interest in buying A and B together for € 8 million. Despite or because of 
the surplus of € 2 million dissension arose between A and B concerning the surplus allocation. 
Even so much dissension arose that the sale for € 8 million to C was eventually cancelled.  
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The example above is perhaps exceptional, but allocation problems occur in all kinds of 
situations. In this paper we analyze and solve an allocation problem in a purchasing cooperative. 
Purchasing cooperatives consist of two or more organizations that share and/or bundle purchasing 
related, information, resources, and/or volumes in order to create symbiotic relationships (based 
on Schotanus and Telgen, 2005). Examples of symbiotic relationships are mutualism and 
parasitism (e.g. Johnson et al., 1997). In cooperative purchasing preferably mutualistic 
relationships are created in which all of the cooperating organizations benefit financially or in 
any other way by cooperating. As we illustrated in the example, even in mutualistic relationships 
allocation problems can occur. The same accounts to mutualistic purchasing cooperatives. 
Especially in cooperatives in which the cooperating organizations differ in terms like size. Due to 
these differences it is difficult to find fair allocation solutions in theory (e.g. Heijboer, 2003; 
Schotanus, 2004). We propose that to be able to tackle allocation problems one should look at 
least at the theoretical fairness of an allocation solution.   
 
Theoretical fairness  
 
Based on analytical research numerous authors proposed different solutions to theoretical 
unfairness in allocation problems. Some authors proposed solutions to allocation problems in 
cooperative purchasing (e.g. Heijboer, 2003; Schotanus, 2004; Singer, 1985). They proposed, 
and/or analyzed several allocation methods like (see appendix A for their descriptions):  
• Average Cost Pricing, i.e. Proportional 
Amount (e.g. Heijboer, 2003); 
• Compromise Price (Schotanus, 2004) 
• Compromise Value (Borm et al., 1992); 
• Equal Amount (e.g. Heijboer, 2003); 
• Equal Price (e.g. Schotanus, 2005b); 
• Nucleolus (e.g. Schmeidler 1969); 
• Shapley Value (Shapley, 1953). 
 
Heijboer (2003) and Schotanus (2004) analyzed the fairness of these allocation methods for 
purchasing cooperatives in terms of cooperative game theory. To this end they used general 
theoretical properties of fairness (e.g. Friedman, 2003; Moulin, 2001; Shapley, 1953) like (see 
appendix B for their descriptions): 
• Additivity (ADD); 
• Dummy (DUM); 
• Efficiency (EFF); 
• Fair Ranking (FR); 
• Monotonicity (MON); 
• Stability (STA); 
• Symmetry (SYM). 
The analytical body of knowledge about theoretical allocation properties and methods is large. 
See for instance journals as the International Journal of Game Theory, the Journal Games and 
Economic Behavior, the Journal of Economic Theory or the Journal of Applied Mathematics. 
Consequently, we already know (a) numerous theoretical properties of fairness. We know (b) 
how to develop (c) theoretically fair allocation methods building on these properties. And we 
know (d) how to calculate (e) theoretically fair allocations using these methods (see figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Generic Representation of the Allocation Process 
The two most popular allocation methods in analytical literature are the Shapley Value and the 
Nucleolus (Meurer, 1999). Both methods are considered to be theoretically fair in various 
situations (e.g. Heijboer, 2003). Nevertheless, only a few real-life applications exist of the 
Nucleolus. In most cases, its use has been motivated as an alternative to the Shapley value 
(Serrano, 1999). The Shapley value has been applied in some real-life situations, like calculating 
political power (Shapley and Shubik, 1954); calculating landing and take-off fees for 
Birmingham airport (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977); and allocating railways infrastructure 
costs (Fragnelli et al., 2000). Still, the real-life application of the Shapley Value has been very 
limited. To our knowledge the method has never been used in for instance purchasing 
cooperatives. The Equal Price method is usually used in purchasing cooperatives (Schotanus, 
2005b), despite the fact that it: 
• Is considered to be theoretically unfair in terms of cooperative game theory (Heijboer, 2003); 
• Sometimes leads to premature endings of cooperatives (Schotanus, 2004); 
• Sometimes hinders the establishment of new cooperatives (Schotanus, 2005a). 
 
In several situations practitioners know the issues above and they are aware of the existence of 
alternative allocation methods which are theoretically fair. Apparently, in allocation problems 
more aspects play a role than theoretical fairness. The perceived realization of an allocation 
method might play an important role as well. If a person is aware of the existence of an allocation 
method, then that does not have to mean that this person also understands how this method 
actually works. Therefore we propose that to be able to tackle allocation problems one should 
look at least at the interaction between the theoretical fairness and perceived realization of 
allocation solutions.  
 
Perceived realization  
 
Both the complexity of allocation problems and methods are linked to perceived realization, i.e. 
perceived understanding. With complexity we refer to computational complexity theory and 
measures as the number of steps that it takes to solve allocation problems with a certain method 
(e.g. Barton et al. 1987). In addition, we take into account cognitive psychology by looking at 
how complicated allocation problems and methods are from the perspectives of all those involved 
(e.g. Funke, 1998). Note that the outcomes of the allocation methods proposed in this paper can 
be calculated within minutes at a regular computer for small cooperatives (≤ nine organizations). 
So, we do not consider the computation time of allocation methods as a limiting condition. 
We assume that the more complex an allocation problem and/or method is, the more difficulties 
usually arise concerning the perceived realization of allocation methods (based on Walker and 
Wooldridge, 1995). In this paper we simply assume that the perceived realization can be 
positively influenced by increased knowledge. Nevertheless, in practice it might be very difficult 
to positively influence the perceived realization of complex allocation problems and methods.  
Perceived realization might influence perceived fairness as well. If it is not clearly understood 
how a method works, then the outcomes might be perceived as unfair. In addition, perceived 
fairness might differ between individuals as we illustrated in the example in the beginning of this 
paper. This could finally lead to allocation conflicts. Therefore we propose that to be able to 
tackle allocation problems one should look at the interaction between the theoretical fairness, 
perceived realization, and perceived fairness of allocation solutions.  
 
Perceived fairness 
 
Several decisions usually have to be taken within the steps of the allocation process. Examples of 
decisions are determining which allocation methods to compare and how to involve all those 
concerned. Based on empirical research numerous authors proposed many different solutions to 
perceived unfairness of decisions in allocation problems. They suggest that the perceived fairness 
of decisions consists of three aspects (e.g. Tax et al., 1998):  
• Procedural fairness (e.g. Leventhal, 1980): how are the decisions made (Tang and Baldwin, 
1996)? 
• Distributive fairness (e.g. Alexander and Ruderman, 1987): what are the decisions (Tang and 
Baldwin, 1996)? How do the decisions affect me and my comparable others (Xia, 2004)? 
• Interactional fairness (e.g. Tax et al., 1998): how are the decisions presented and implemented 
(Hoffman and Kelly, 2000)? 
The empirical body of knowledge about how people perceive allocation methods and its 
outcomes is large (Alexander and Ruderman, 1987; Bolton et al., 2005; Kagel and Roth, 1995). 
See for instance journals as the Journal of Applied Psychology, Social Justice Research, the 
Journal of Economic Psychology or the Academy of Management Journal. Consequently, we 
know that the three aspects of perceived fairness interact in complex ways (Skarlicki and Folger, 
1997). In addition, it is widely accepted that the perceived fairness of decisions can be positively 
influenced if (e.g. Folger and Konovsky, 1989; Johnson et al., 1997; Leventhal, 1980; Moorman, 
1991; Tang and Baldwin, 1996; Tyler and Bies, 1989): 
• There is two-way respectful communication between all those concerned; 
• The procedures are applied consistently and accurately; 
• The procedures are correctable, ethical, and bias is suppressed; 
• All those concerned may express concerns and influence the procedures; 
• All those concerned are familiar and well informed with the situation, with the procedures, 
and the procedure outcomes; 
• And the final aspect is related to revenue management research results. These results suggest 
that the perceived fairness of pricing can be positively influenced by framing (Kimes, 2003; 
Kimes and Wirtz, 2004), i.e., the presentation of economic equivalent prices as a gain or a 
loss. We suggest that the same effect could apply to allocation problems. Thus, in mutualistic 
relationships the emphasis should be placed on the fact that all participating organizations 
gain by cooperating. An emphasis on some organizations receiving more or less gains than 
the others should be prevented.  
 
Perceived unfairness by individuals in allocation solutions tends to lead to reactions of these 
individuals to restore fairness in terms of equity theory (Adams, 1963; Adams, 1965). Some 
individuals are willing to impose a cost – both on self and others – to resist perceived unfairness 
(Greenberg, 1990; Sheppard et al., 1992). This can even happen in mutualistic relationships like 
we illustrated in the example in the beginning of this paper.  
Research relevance and objectives 
  
Summarizing the previous sections, the body of knowledge about theoretically fair allocation 
solutions is large. The empirical body of knowledge about influencing perceptions is large as 
well. However, we do not know very well how theory and perceptions interact in allocation 
problems. To our knowledge no well-established journals exist as a fictitious Journal of Applied 
Psychology and Applied Mathematics Research. Still, allocation conflicts occur often and we can 
hardly explain that despite frequent allocation conflicts due to perception differences, 
theoretically fair allocation methods are rarely used. It is therefore our main objective to obtain 
more insight into influencing and solving allocation problems by confronting theory with 
perceptions in the allocation process (see figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Theoretical versus Perceived Realization and Perceived Fairness in the Allocation Process 
As mentioned before, in this paper we analyze and solve a typical allocation problem in a 
purchasing cooperative. For that reason, our more specific objectives are linked to cooperative 
purchasing. In cooperative purchasing it is currently not known:  
Step (1a): What the perceived importance of properties of fairness is among practitioners. It 
could be that an allocation method satisfies seven out of eight properties. On the
surface of it this may sound fair, but if the eighth property that is not satisfied is
perceived as very important the method is not fair after all. Furthermore, the
importance of the properties may depend on the characteristics of practitioners and
organizations. This may lead to conflicting perceptions of fairness. 
Step (2b): Whether or not it is perceived that an allocation method satisfies certain properties of 
fairness. For instance, it might be that a practitioner thinks that a method satisfies a 
property of fairness, but that it can be proven theoretically that this is false. 
Step (3c): Whether or not fair allocation methods in terms of cooperative game theory are
perceived to be fair in practice as well. 
Step (4d): Whether or not it is perceived that the allocation of a method is perceived as fair as the
corresponding method. For instance, it might be that a practitioner perceives a certain 
method as fair, but perceives the matching allocation in cold hard cash as unfair. 
Step (5e): Whether or not the actual allocation is perceived to be fair. 
It is one of our specific objectives to shed more light on these steps and their interactions. 
Furthermore, we aim to build recommendations on which steps should be influenced if one 
would want to influence theory and/or perceptions. Our final specific objective is to develop a 
general model for solving allocation problems. With this model we aim to find a theoretically fair 
and perceived fair allocation method for the purchasing cooperative studied. 
Organizational context  
 
The heads of purchasing of eleven medical organizations – all members of one purchasing 
cooperative – are involved in our study. The cooperative is well-known in the public sector in its 
homeland and is considered as a classic example of successful cooperative purchasing. The 
cooperative booked plentiful purchasing savings, employs one full time purchasing manager, and 
has numerous cooperative contracts. Nevertheless, the cooperating organizations are not always 
like hand and glove. The added value of cooperating is sometimes a discussion point, as is the 
allocation of gains. The allocation is difficult for this cooperative as the organizations differ from 
each other (e.g. differences in purchasing volume, professional level of the purchasing function, 
and level of involvement). Recently, two organizations even left the cooperative leaving nine 
organizations. See table 1 for some quantitative properties of these organizations.   
Size Organization Annual 
Procurement in € 
Number of 
Beds 
Annual Procurement 
in € per Bed 
Large 1 55.000.000 881 62.429 
 2 54.000.000 712 75.843 
 3 40.600.000 617 65.802 
Medium 4 28.800.000 600 48.000 
 5 23.000.000 390 58.974 
 6 21.500.000 359 59.889 
Small 7 12.000.000 275 43.636 
 8 11.500.000 187 61.497 
 9 9.500.000 140 67.857 
Total  255.900.000 4.161 61.500 
Table 1. Quantitative Properties of the Cooperating Organizations 
To prevent more organizations leaving the cooperative the gain allocation method was brought up 
for discussion. The gains were usually allocated with the Equal Price method, i.e. all 
organizations pay the same price per item (e.g. Schotanus, 2005b). This method is perceived as 
unfair by the cooperative. For this reason a new method called Differential Pricing was tested in 
one tender. This method implies that all organizations receive a small fixed discount percentage. 
On top of that, larger organizations receive a larger extra discount percentage. Differential 
Pricing is perceived as unfair as well by the cooperative. Therefore, the researchers were asked to 
assist the cooperative in finding a fairer method than Equal Price and Differential Pricing.  
Empirical Methodology  
 
We first carried out interviews with two key persons to better understand the allocation problem. 
Based on these interviews and secondary data we built a draft questionnaire with a mix of 
question types. The questionnaire was first sent to a focus group to test the questions. We paid 
special attention to the clear explanation of properties of fairness and allocation methods. The 
final questionnaire was filled in by all of the nine organizations and consisted of three parts:  
Part (1): The first part consisted of general questions.  
Part (2): The second part consisted of questions related to two cases based on actual contracts of 
the cooperative. For both cases we provided actual allocations, but we did not provide
information on which allocation methods were used. For all allocations for the 
cooperative the respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they perceived the
allocation as fair.  
Part (3): The third part consisted of questions related to:  
• The perceived importance of several properties of fairness; 
• Whether or not several properties of fairness are perceived as realized for the 
purchasing cooperative for the well-known Equal Price method; 
• Whether or not several allocation methods are perceived as fair.  
The next phase of our study consisted of sending a brief report of a theoretical analysis of 
allocation problems to all of the respondents. We send this report in order to increase knowledge 
on theoretical allocation properties, methods, and realizations. The final phase consisted of a 
presentation and discussion of our findings at a workshop. All of the respondents attended this 
workshop and in the end of the meeting a preliminary decision was made concerning the 
allocation method. After some time to consider the matter the final decision was made. 
Findings and discussion 
We discuss our findings by using the five steps described in figure 2 as a connecting thread. We 
compare the outcomes of the five steps after we have discussed each of them individually.  
Step (1a): Axiomatic fairness 
 
For this first step we asked the respondents for the perceived importance of several properties of 
fairness. This concerns the axiomatic fairness. We state that an allocation method is axiomatically 
fairer than another method if it satisfies more properties of fairness that are perceived as 
important. As a fairly subjective measure we assign a 5 (very fair) to a method that satisfies all of 
the properties used. We assign a 1 (very unfair) to a method that satisfies no properties. For the 
methods k in between we calculate the axiomatic fairness AFk by taking into account theory and 
the average perceived importance APIp of each allocation property p for M properties. The 
variable skp has got a value 1 or 0 if property p respectively is satisfied or is not satisfied in theory 
by method k for the purchasing situations of the cooperative. AFk can then be formulated as: 
( )
1
1
4
1
M
kp p
p
k M
p
p
s API
AF
API
⋅
=
=
= +
∑
∑
           (1) 
Note that one general mark of the axiomatic fairness of a method cannot exist as the perceived 
importance of properties of fairness may differ per situation. Note also that several properties 
conflict in theory and cannot both be satisfied at the same time in specific situations (e.g. Herrero, 
1999). So, it is theoretically impossible to satisfy all of the properties in different situations while 
using one allocation method. One theoretically fairest method can therefore not exist.  
In table 2 we show the average perceived importance APIp of several properties p for the 
cooperative. The table also shows if the properties of different methods are theoretically satisfied 
for the purchasing situations of the cooperative (proofs have been omitted here). Finally, the 
allocation methods are ranked by their complexity and their axiomatic fairness AFk is given.  
Simple  Moderately Complex  Complex  p APIp of all 
Organi-
zations 
Equal 
Amount 
Average 
Cost Pricing 
Equal 
Price*
Differential 
Pricing* 
Compromise 
Value 
Compromise 
Price 
Nucleolus Shapley 
Value**
EFF           4,9 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
STA          4,4 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
DUM        4,2 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
FR            4,0 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
SYM         3,6 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
ADD         3,4 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
MON        3,3 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
AFk 3,8 3,9 3,9 3,9 4,5 4,5 4,5 5,0 
Note:  ?, (?) means theoretically (not) satisfied in general for the purchasing situations of the cooperative 
* is already perceived as unfair in previous tenders by the purchasing cooperative 
** is considered to be too complex by the purchasing cooperative 
The 2nd column is measured on a five point Likert scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important)  
Table 2. Axiomatic Fairness of Allocation Methods 
We found no remarkable differences between the individual scores of the respondents. Interesting 
methods can therefore be easily chosen given the preconditions, the allocation properties used, 
and their perceived importance. Here the Compromise Value is the fairest and relatively least 
complex method. The methods Average Cost Pricing and Equal Amount are simple alternatives. 
The consideration between complexity and theoretical fairness concerning an allocation method 
is related to what we call the complexity dilemma. Some allocation methods satisfy the same 
properties of fairness as other methods and satisfy some extra properties as well. Those methods 
are theoretically fairer than the others. However, theoretically fairer allocation methods tend to be 
more complex. To our experience an allocation method as the Equal Price method is usually 
considered as simple and is theoretically unfair for purchasing cooperatives. A method as the 
Compromise Value is usually considered as moderately complex and is theoretically quite fair. A 
method as the Shapley Value is often considered as (too) complex and is theoretically fair. 
Step (2b): Axiomatic realization 
 
For this second step we asked the respondents which properties of fairness are satisfied by the 
Equal Price method that they know very well. This concerns the axiomatic realization. We state 
that the axiomatic realization from allocation properties to a method is higher if differences 
between theory and perception are lower. As a fairly subjective measure we assign a 5 (very 
high) if there are no differences between theory and perception (e.g. satisfied in theory and 
satisfied in perception). We assign a 1 (very low) if the differences are maximal. For the methods 
k in between we calculate the axiomatic realization ARk by comparing theory with the average 
perceived realization APRkp of each allocation property p for M properties. The variable skp has 
got a value 1 or 0 if property p respectively is satisfied or is not satisfied in theory for the 
purchasing situations of the cooperative by method k. ARk can then be formulated as: 
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In table 3 we show the theoretical realization skp, the average perceived realization APRkp and the 
axiomatic realization ARk for different groups of organizations and k is the Equal Prize method. 
The allocation properties p are ranked by their average perceived importance.  
p  skp APRkp of all 
Organizations 
APRkp of Large 
Organizations 
APRkp of Medium 
Organizations 
APRkp of Small 
Organizations 
 
EFF 1 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0  
STA 1 0,4 0,3 0,7 0,3  
DUM 1 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2  
FR 0 0,4 0,3 0,7 0,2  
SYM 1 0,4 0,3 0,7 0,3  
ADD 0 0,4 0,0 0,5 0,7  
MON 1 0,9 0,8 1,0 1,0  
ARk 3,5 3,6 3,6 3,3  
Note: The 2nd column is measured on a true (1) or false (0) scale with a do not know option (0,5)  
Table 3. Axiomatic Realization of k = Equal Price  
 
To be able to make a well-founded decision concerning an allocation method special attention 
needs to be given to important allocation properties with large average differences between 
perception and theory. The same applies if there are many do not know answers for a certain 
property. Finally, if there are allocation methods with low ARk scores these need to be given 
special attention as well. If necessary, step 1b needs to be reconsidered.  
Here attention needed to be given to STA, DUM, and FR as these are perceived as important 
properties but have low APRk scores. For instance, sometimes the respondents thought that the 
Equal Price method satisfies FR, while it does not in theory.  
 
Step (3c): Methodical fairness  
 
For this third step we asked the respondents for the perceived fairness of several allocation 
methods. This concerns a direct measurement of the methodical fairness. In table 4 we show the 
average methodical fairness MFk for different groups of organizations. The methods k are ranked 
by their complexity.  
 
k MFk of all 
Organizations 
MFk of Large 
Organizations 
MFk of Medium 
Organizations 
MFk of Small 
Organizations 
 
Equal Amount 2,1 2,0 1,0 3,3  
Average Cost Pricing 3,8 4,0 4,7 2,7  
Equal Price* 3,8 3,0 4,0 4,3  
Differential Pricing* 2,3 3,0 2,7 1,3  
Compromise Value 2,7 1,7 3,3 3,0  
Compromise Price 3,1 2,0 4,3 3,0  
Nucleolus 2,3 1,7 3,0 2,3  
Note: * is already perceived as unfair in previous tenders by the purchasing cooperative 
The columns are measured on a five point Likert scale from 1 (not fair) to 5 (very fair)  
Table 4. Methodical Fairness of Allocation Methods 
Remarkably, a theoretically fair method as the Nucleolus is perceived as unfair. The same 
accounts to a smaller extent to the Compromise Value and the Compromise Price. Possible 
explanations could be related to the complexity of the methods. If the respondents are not sure 
what the exact outcomes of a method are, then they could perceive the method as unfair. We 
discuss another explanation in section 5e.  
Furthermore, there seem to be perception differences between the different groups of 
organizations. Small organizations dislike the Average Cost Pricing and the Differential Pricing 
method compared to larger organizations. In theory these methods favor larger organizations 
(proofs have been omitted here). Larger organizations dislike the Equal Price and the Equal 
Amount method. In theory these methods favor smaller organizations (proofs have been omitted 
here). Organizational size plays apparently an important role in the perceived fairness of the 
allocation methods analyzed. On average, the method Average Cost Pricing is perceived as the 
fairest one. When considering the different groups the method scores a high minimum as well.  
Step (4d): Methodical realization  
 
For this fourth step we compared the outcomes of step 3c and 5e. We choose this indirect 
measure to reduce the number of questions in our questionnaire. We measured the perceived 
fairness directly in both step 3c and 5e. As we measured the perceived fairness indirectly in step 
1a, we did not apply the same comparison in step 2b.  
We state that the methodical realization from allocation methods to allocations is higher if 
perception differences are lower. As a fairly subjective measure we assign a 5 (very high) if there 
are no perception differences. We assign a 1 (very low) if the differences are maximal. For the 
methods k in between we calculate the methodical realization MRk by comparing the perceived 
fairness of methods MFik with the perceived fairness of matching allocations for each 
organization i for N organizations. The perceived fairness of allocations DFikl is calculated over O 
cases for each allocation l that theoretically matches method k. MRk can then be formulated as: 
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In table 5 we show the methodical realization MRk of several methods k for different groups of 
organizations. 
k MRk MRk of Large 
Organizations 
MRk of Medium 
Organizations 
MRk of Small 
Organizations 
 
Equal Amount 4,4 m 4,5 5,0 3,5  
Average Cost Pricing 4,3 d 4,5 4,7 3,3  
Equal Price 4,1 m   4,2 4,2 3,8  
Differential Pricing 3,3 d 2,5 3,7 4,0  
Compromise Value 3,5 m 3,7 3,3 3,5  
Compromise Price 3,4 m  3,7 3,2 3,5  
Nucleolus 3,8 d 3,0 4,3 4,3  
Note: The columns are measured on a five point Likert scale from 1 (not fair) to 5 (very fair)  
Table 5. Methodical Realization of Allocation Methods 
To be able to make a well-founded decision concerning an allocation method special attention 
needs to be given to methods with a low MRk, especially if these methods are interesting 
according to step 1a and 3c. If necessary, step 3c needs to be reconsidered. Note that the more 
complex a method is, the more difficulties could arise concerning the perceived realization. 
Here attention needed to be given to the Differential Pricing method with a low minimum score 
for one of the groups. The methods Average Cost Pricing, and the Compromise Value needed 
attention as well as these are interesting according to step 1a and 3c, but do not have high scores 
for all of the groups.  
 
Step (5e): Distributive fairness 
 
For this final step we asked the respondents for the perceived fairness of actual allocations in two 
comparable cases, without providing information on which methods were used. In both cases the 
same amount of gains needed to be allocated among the organizations. The only difference 
between the cases concerned the used quantity discount price function, i.e. a derived function 
from quantity discount schedules.  
The perceived fairness of allocations concerns a direct measurement of the distributive fairness. 
In table 6 we show the average distributive fairness DFk for different groups of organizations. 
The methods k are ranked by the extent they favor large organizations in the two cases analyzed. 
The final column shows the similarities in perceptions PSk between the first case PFC1i and the 
second case PFC2i for each organization i for N organizations. PSk can then be formulated as: 
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For instance, a methods scores a value of 5,0 if there are no perception differences between both 
cases for all organizations.  
 
k DFk of all 
Organizations 
DFk of Large 
Organizations 
DFk of Medium 
Organizations 
DFk of Small 
Organizations 
PSk of all 
Organizations  
Differential Pricing* 3,4 3,5 4,0 2,5 4,6 
Average Cost Pricing** 4,3 4,2 4,3 4,3 4,8 
Equal Price*,*** 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,3 1,9 
Compromise Price 2,6 2,7 2,5 2,5 3,9 
Compromise Value 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,5 4,3 
Nucleolus 2,4 3,0 2,3 1,8 4,4 
Equal Amount** 1,4 1,8 1,0 1,5 4,9 
Note: * is already perceived as unfair in previous tenders by the purchasing cooperative 
** has the exact same allocations in both cases 
*** generally favors small organizations to a larger extent than in the two cases analyzed 
The columns are measured on a five point Likert scale from 1 (not fair) to 5 (very fair)  
Table 6. Distributive Fairness of Allocation Methods 
It is remarkable that the actual allocations of theoretically fair methods as the Nucleolus are 
perceived as unfair. The sheer complexity of these methods cannot explain this as the respondents 
only had to asses the allocations. A somewhat far-fetched explanation is that the respondents 
could assess the fairness of allocations by (subconsciously or consciously) deriving the 
underlying method. However, the edge is taken off that explanation by step 4d. Therefore, we 
propose that the explanation relates to the size of the organizations. Here the Average Cost 
Pricing method is perceived as the fairest method. Except for Differential Pricing, the perceived 
fairness of the other methods – including the complex ones – decreases steadily when small 
organizations are favored to a larger extent.  
Another remarkable result concerns the fact that there are not many perception differences 
between the different groups. Only one clear difference is found in the Differential Pricing 
method that favors large organizations to a large extent. Perception differences in the Nucleolus 
method can be explained by an outlying score of one the respondents.  
Finally, it is evident that the Equal Price method is perceived inconsistently with a low PSk score 
in the final column of table 6. While using a common linear quantity discount price function 
(Schotanus, 2006) the method is perceived as (very) fair, but while using a common curved 
function (Schotanus, 2006) the method is perceived as unfair. This indicates the importance of 
considering several cases when choosing an allocation method for the long run.  
How to solve an allocation problem? 
 
To solve an allocation problem the perceived realization needs to be sufficient (step 2b and 4d) 
and the theoretical and perceived fairness need to be weighted up against each other (step 1a, 3c, 
and 5e). Influencing the perceived fairness of 1a is difficult as the perceived fairness of allocation 
properties is often considered as a limiting condition. The perceived fairness of 5e is an outcome 
of the method in 3c. Therefore, if necessary the perceived fairness of the method in 3c should 
preferably be influenced (based on Alexander and Ruderman, 1987).  
Only the Average Cost Pricing method scored sufficiently in most of the steps in our case study 
(see table 7). In addition, the method lies in between the methods Equal Price and Differential 
Pricing when looking at favoring respectively small or large organizations in general. The main 
disadvantage of the Average Cost Pricing method is that it does not satisfy STA. The 
Compromise Price or the Compromise Value method would have been theoretically fairer 
alternatives.  
← Favors Small Organization in General Favors Large Organization in General →p APIp  
Equal 
Amount 
Equal 
Price* 
Nucleolus Compromise 
Value 
Compromise 
Price 
Average 
Cost Pricing 
Differential 
Pricing* 
EFF           4,9 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
STA          4,4 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
DUM        4,2 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
FR             4,0 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
AFk 3,8 3,9 4,5 4,5 4,5 3,9 3,9 
Minimum AFk 3,6 3,8 4,5 4,5 4,5 3,9 3,9 
MFk 2,1 3,8 2,3 2,7 3,1 3,8 2,3 
Minimum MFk 1,0 3,0 1,7 1,7 2,0 2,7 1,3 
DFk 1,4 3,2 2,4 2,4 2,6 4,3 3,4 
Minimum DFk 1,0 3,2 1,8 2,3 2,5 4,2 2,5 
PSk  4,9 1,9 4,4 4,3 3,9 4,8 4,6 
Minimum PSk 4,7 1,3 4,3 4,3 3,7 4,7 4,3 
Average** 2,8 3,0 3,2 3,3 3,4 4,0 3,3 
Note:  ?, (?) means theoretically (not) satisfied in general for the purchasing situations of the cooperative 
* is already perceived as unfair in previous tenders by the purchasing cooperative 
** the averages are fairly subjective and are only indicated for easy reference 
Perception is measured on a five point Likert scale from 1 (negative) to 5 (positive) 
Table 7. Perceived Fairness of Allocation Methods Summarized 
We propose a general model for solving allocation problems in figure 3 as a summary of the 
previous sections. The steps in this model imply among other things that all those concerned in 
the allocation problem are familiar with the situation, understand it as good as possible, and are 
involved in the complete transparent process. In addition, bias is suppressed and consistency is 
enforced to a large extent. Using the model took the respondents about three hours by filling in 
the questionnaire, reading relevant materials, and attending a workshop. 
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Figure 3. A General Model for Solving Allocation Problems 
Limitations and further research 
There are some limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. These could 
be interesting aspects for further research as well. First of all, to find significant relationships 
between different groups a large-scale survey will be necessary. More relationships could also be 
found when studying the five steps individually into more detail. Finding significant relationships 
is however not the objective of this paper, as is obtaining more insight into influencing and 
solving allocation problems by studying the broader picture.  
Second, not all specific aspects of perceived fairness are taken into account in our study. To 
reduce the number of questions in our questionnaire we did not use a construct for perceived 
fairness. In addition, some aspects not defined as perceived fairness as e.g. applicability could 
have influenced the respondents’ answers related to perceived fairness.  
Third, the two cases we choose in step 5e differ only in one aspect. More aspects could be 
considered. In addition, more measures could be used if questionnaires are sent to the 
respondents at different points in time.  
Fourth, allocation problems become even more complex when also considering cooperative costs 
and logistical gains. Finding a fair solution in these situations might become impossible without 
assuming that some aspects (e.g. allocation of costs) should be considered as limiting conditions.  
Finally, our fairness properties could be defined more specifically. We used a broad definition for 
a property as FR. This makes it difficult to find differences between separate groups. Other 
properties and methods might be considered as well. Note that it will be difficult for most people 
to fully grasp more complex properties and methods. We already encountered difficulties with 
explaining the ones we used. Further research to new theoretical allocation methods to create a 
better fit with perception might therefore need a new rigorous way of thinking. 
Conclusions 
Our conclusions relate to our main objective: to obtain more insight into solving allocation 
problems by taking into account the perceived fairness and realization of theoretically fair 
allocation solutions. Our specific objectives are linked to cooperative purchasing. First, we 
conclude that both theoretical and perceived fairness have been studied intensively separately. 
However, more research is necessary on the interaction between theory and perceptions to be able 
to fully understand and solve allocation problems.  
Second, the interaction between theory and perceptions can be modeled into a five step model 
(see figure 2). The steps deal with (1a) axiomatic fairness, (2b) axiomatic realization, (3c) 
methodical fairness, (4d) methodical realization, and (5e) distributive fairness. For each of the 
steps a comparable measure is developed which can be used to efficiently solve allocation 
problems. To improve theoretical allocation solutions the focus should be on 1a and 3c. To 
influence perceptions the focus should be on steps 2b, 3c, and 4d.  
Third, the consideration between theory and complexity leads to a complexity dilemma: 
theoretically fair methods tend to be more complex than theoretically unfair methods. On top of 
that, complex methods are perceived as less fair than some simple methods in our case study.  
Fourth, the perceived realization of allocation methods was initially not completely clear to the 
respondents. For instance, sometimes they thought that a well-known method satisfies a certain 
property, while it does not in theory. Sometimes it was the other way around. 
Fifth, the perceived fairness of allocations of the Equal Price method is very inconsistent. In one 
tender its allocations are perceived as fair and in another tender as unfair. Remarkably, the 
allocations of several theoretically fair methods are also perceived as unfair. Our explanation is 
that organizational size plays an important role in the perceived fairness of a method.  
Sixth, the Average Cost Pricing method is overall perceived as the fairest method for the 
purchasing cooperative studied. The Compromise Price or the Compromise Value method would 
have been theoretically fairer alternatives. 
Finally, all of the steps discussed in this paper can be modeled into a general model for solving 
allocation problems (see figure 3). Using this model implies that both theory and perceptions are 
taken into account to solve allocation problems as good as possible. 
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Appendix A: Descriptions of the allocation methods 
 
(1) Average Cost Pricing: The gains are divided proportionally by the purchasing quantities. 
(2) Compromise Price: The gains are divided proportionally by the added value of the 
organizations, while taking into account the minimal claim of an organization. The added 
value of an organization A equals the difference between the total savings of the cooperative 
and the savings of the cooperative without organization A. The minimal claim of an 
organization A equals the part of the savings that are created by and for organization A 
(Schotanus, 2004). 
(3) Compromise Value: The gains are divided proportionally by the added value of the 
organizations (Borm et al., 1992) in purchasing cooperatives (Heijboer 2003). 
(4) Differential Pricing: All organizations receive a same small fixed discount percentage. On 
top of that, larger organizations receive a larger extra discount percentage. Note that 
determining the percentages is the difficult part of this method. 
(5) Equal Amount: The gains are divided equally.   
(6) Equal Price: All organizations pay the same price per item (e.g. Schotanus, 2005b) 
(7) Nucleolus: The Nucleolus minimizes the maximum dissatisfaction level of all possible 
coalitions. As a measure for dissatisfaction, an excess factor is used. (Schmeidler 1969). The 
Nucleolus implies among other things that for each player the pay-off of cooperation is higher 
than the pay-off of working alone (Heijboer, 2003). It finds a solution that minimizes total 
dissatisfaction for a cooperative. However, this does not have to mean that all cooperating 
organizations are satisfied. 
(8) Shapley Value: The Shapley Value looks at different sequences of organizations entering a 
cooperative for all possible coalitions. When organization A enters an empty coalition no 
savings are allocated to this organization. When organization B enters this coalition it 
receives all of the savings this organization creates for the cooperative. For all of the possible 
coalitions for each organization all of its allocations are added up and divided by the total 
number of coalitions. This amount equals the allocation of an organization (Shapley, 1953).  
Appendix B: Descriptions of the allocation properties 
 
(1) ADD: A cooperative could be used for multiple (types of) items at the same time. Each item 
could be treated as a separate game with a separate allocation. The gains from all items could 
also be added up and be allocated at once. It seems fair that when the same allocation method 
would be used for each item separately or for all items together the total amount allocated to 
each organization should be the same. This is another way of saying that ADD has to hold. 
(2) DUM: Means that a non-contributing organization should not get anything. 
(3) EFF: All gains are allocated back to the organizations in a cooperative. 
(4) FR: Means that this property is satisfied if an organization with an equal or larger quantity of 
items to be purchased through a cooperative receives an equal or larger share of the gains. 
(5) MON: Satisfying this property means that if the quantity of items to be purchased by one 
organization in a cooperative stays equal or becomes larger than in a former situation, this 
organization should receive an equal or larger amount of gains.  
(6) STA: Means that for each organization the pay-off of cooperation in the grand coalition is 
equal or higher than the pay-off of working alone or in any other sub coalition. 
(7) SYM: Means that equal organizations in a cooperative should get equal pay-offs. 
 
 
